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I. INTRODUCTION
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld has lost one audience and gained another in
the one hundred years since he wrote Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning.1  Hohfeld intended his work principally
* © 2018 Peter Westen. Frank G. Millard Professor of Law, Emeritus, University
of Michigan Law School. 
1. Hohfeld published the work in two parts, the first of which appeared in the Yale
Law Journal in 1913, and the second of which appeared in the Yale Law Journal in 1917.  
I shall cite the work in the way Yale University Press subsequently published it in 1919, 
when it combined the two parts and entitled them Fundamental Legal Conceptions. See 
generally WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (Walter Wheeler 
Cook ed., 3d prtg. 1964). 
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for law-school students,2 and his conceptual framework initially became 
an official part of law-school curricula.3 Over time, however, law professors
have lost interest in Hohfeld, leaving law students knowing scarcely anything 
of Hohfeld.4 Meanwhile, Hohfeld has gained a new audience among moral 
theorists who increasingly take his conceptual apparatus as a touchstone
for analysis, such that one can hardly read broadly in moral and legal theory
of self-defense without coming across multiple references to Hohfeld. 
Unfortunately, too much of what theorists say of Hohfeld is incorrect. 
Theorists all too often misunderstand him, including writers who value 
analytical rigor.  Poor Hohfeld; his mission was to promote “clear thinking 
and exact expression.”5  Yet, if he were alive today, he would see himself
invoked for propositions he explicitly disavowed. 
Hohfeld endeavored to establish at least seven propositions:
1.	 His conceptions are analytic in nature. 
2.	 His conceptions address after-the-fact legal relations that 
arise from antecedent mental and physical events. 
3.	 Generic entitlements—such as rights—should be replaced with 
more perspicuous conceptions, namely, claim-rights, liberties,
powers, and immunities, and their respective correlatives— 
duties, no-rights, liabilities, and disabilities. 
4.	 His conceptions are comprehensive and thus capable of 
encompassing any jural relation in law. 
5.	 The correlative of a liberty is a no-right, while its opposite is 
a duty;
6.	 His conceptions are directed, specifying precisely whom they
are among; and,
7.	 He intends his conceptions for legal relations, not moral 
relationships—hence his title, Fundamental Legal Conceptions.6 
Criminal law theorists commonly invoke Hohfeld as authority for assertions
that are contrary to propositions 1–7.  To illustrate, I shall focus on Uwe 
Steinhoff’s justifications for the use of force, while making occasional
references to other commentators who write about self-defense.7
 2. 	Id. at 27. 
3.  For Hohfeld’s application in the classroom, see Arthur L. Corbin, Foreword to 
WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS, at vii, xi (Walter Wheeler 
Cook ed., 3d prtg. 1964) [hereinafter Corbin].
4. Curtis Nyquist, Teaching Wesley Hohfeld’s Theory of Legal Relations, 52 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 238, 238 (2002). 
5. 	Corbin, supra note 3, at 75 (2d prtg. 1920). 
6. 	See id. at 3–11. 
7. See generally Uwe Steinhoff, Just War Theory: Self-Defense, Necessity, and 
the Ethics of Armed Conflicts (2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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II. HOHFELD’S CONCEPTIONS ARE ANALYTIC IN NATURE
Hohfeld emphasizes that his conceptions are analytic in nature.8  They
are tools to characterize such normative relations as jurisdictions may wish to
establish through law.  Stated differently, the relations Hohfeld discusses 
are logical in nature, not normative.  Thus, Hohfeldian liberties are defined 
by reference to claim-rights; powers are defined by reference to claim-rights, 
liberties, and immunities; immunities are defined by reference to powers;
and the “correlatives” and “opposites” of claim-rights—liberties, powers,
and immunities—are defined by reference to one or another of the four
aforementioned conceptions.9  As such, Hohfeld’s conceptions come into
play after jurisdictions establish normative relations and, then, only for the
purpose of describing them, not for the purpose of constraining them.
Steinhoff runs afoul of Hohfeld in attempting to explain when an actor, 
A, owes compensation to a person, B, who possesses a claim-right vis-à­
vis A not to be harmed.10 The answer, Steinhoff argues, depends upon 
whether B has forfeited his claim-right not to be harmed, thereby leaving 
A with a Hohfeldian liberty to harm B—in which case A does not owe B
compensation—or whether B retains a claim-right not to be harmed but A 
is justified in “overriding” it—in which case A escapes punishment for 
harming B but owes B compensation for harming him.11  To illustrate the
difference, Steinhoff contrasts a culpable aggressor, who has forfeited his
claim-right not to be harmed, with a pharmacist who has not: 
A Culpable Aggressor Who Forfeits Claim-Rights: 

No Compensation Owed 

The basic idea of [forfeiture to explain self-defense] is that the aggressor through his 
aggression forfeits his own right not to be attacked, that is, he becomes liable to
counter-attack: he can now be attacked without wronging him, without violating his
rights.  This view, at least as far as culpable attackers are concerned, seems to be a
very popular one at least in philosophical discussions of self- and other-defense, and
many subscribe to it even in the case of innocent attackers. The advantage of this
view is that it can straightforwardly explain why the defender does not owe the 
aggressor compensation for the harm the former inflicted on the latter in justified
self-defense: by harming him he did not wrong him, did not violate his rights, and 
therefore no compensation is due.  Accounts, on the other hand, that in one way or 
8. See HOHFELD, supra note 1, at 1–6, 25–27; Corbin, supra note 3, at x–xi. 
9. HOHFELD, supra note 1, at 36, 38–39, 50, 60. 
10. See Steinhoff, supra note 7, at 36–37. 
11. Id.
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another construct the self-defense justification as some kind of necessity justification 
(that is, as a justification that justifies overriding rights of others) cannot really
explain this, at least not in any straightforward manner. After all, if one harms an 
aggressor, in particular a culpable aggressor, in necessary and proportionate self-
defense one does not owe him any compensation.12 




From so-called “necessity justifications” or “choice of evil justifications” it is well known
that sometimes it can be justified to infringe a person’s rights for the sake of a
much greater good.  For example, if someone has a heart attack in front of the
window of a closed pharmacy at night, and the only way Pauline can save him is
to smash the window and give him the life-saving drug, then morally, and legally in
many jurisdictions, Pauline is justified in doing so although she thereby infringes
the property rights of the pharmacy owner.  This is shown in the fact that legally (and
morally) Pauline would owe him compensation for the smashed window; yet, while
she owes him compensation, she is not punishable.  In fact, she is . . . fully justified.  
Thus, we are dealing here with a justified rights infringement: you can justifiably do
something to someone (for example damage his or her property) although she or
he has a right against you doing it.13
. . . .
[I]f one harms another person in the course of overriding a right of this
person, one would normally owe him compensation. . . . He has a right to 
[compensation].14
The first thing to note about Steinhoff’s discussion of forfeiture is that 
neither forfeiture nor forfeit figure anywhere in Hohfeld’s Fundamental 
Legal Conceptions.15  Instead, Hohfeld propounds alternative conceptions
to account for changes in jural relations of the kind that occur in A Culpable 
Aggressor, namely, powers and liabilities.16  If Hohfeld were confronted
with a case like A Culpable Aggressor—that is, a case in which A’s jural 
relation to B changes from B’s having a claim-right against A to B’s not 
having it—Hohfeld would invoke the language of powers and liabilities.
He would say that (i) the culpable aggressor’s claim-right against the
defender not to be harmed has always been subject to a liability on the 
aggressor’s part, a liability to his claim-right being negated; (ii) the defender’s
duty to the culpable aggressor, in turn, has always been subject to the defender’s
power to negate the aggressor’s claim-right; and (iii) the liability and power
 12. Id. at 36 (footnotes omitted). 
13. Id. at 33 (footnotes omitted). 
14. Id. at 36.  Steinhoff cites no legal authority that Pauline owes the pharmacist 
compensation; and I am not aware of any.  However, because a jurisdiction could, in theory, 
require compensation, I shall assume that Pauline’s jurisdiction does.
15. See generally HOHFELD, supra note 1.
 16. See id. at 36. 
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both became operative when the culpable aggressor wrongly attacked the 
defender and the defender chose to respond.17  By virtue of the liability/ 
power becoming operative, the culpable aggressor ceased to have a claim-
right vis-à-vis the defender not to be harmed and, consequently—and
logically—the defender possessed a liberty-right to harm the aggressor. 
There is no “alchemy”18 involved those changes in jural relations. Nor, 
if the underlying changes are normatively appropriate, does a commentator 
need “knock-down argument[s]” to “prove”19 that one set of jural entitlements 
have been replaced with their opposites.  On the contrary, if, in a jurisdiction’s 
judgment, events render it normatively appropriate that existing jural 
entitlements be replaced with their oppositions, Hohfeld’s conceptions of
powers and liabilities function to conceptualize the normative events that 
produce the changes in jural relations.20 
The second thing to note is that Hohfeld nowhere refers to a person who
“justifiably infringe[s]”21—or, synonymously, overrides—the claim-right 
of another.22  Indeed, conceptions of justifiable infringements of claim-
rights are foreign to Hohfeld.  This does not mean that Hohfeld believes Pauline 
should be punished for harming the pharmacist by appropriating his drugs.
Nor does it mean that Hohfeld believes Pauline should be allowed to harm
the pharmacist without compensating him; Hohfeld has no views on the 
matter one way or another. If a jurisdiction believes Pauline may appropriate 
the pharmacist’s drugs but must compensate him, Hohfeld would have no 
objection.  Rather, instead of saying Pauline may infringe the pharmacist’s 
claim-right, Hohfeld would say the pharmacist’s claim-right has always
been subject to Pauline’s power to change the pharmacist’s relation to her
in the event of a life-threatening emergency.  Further, Pauline’s power to negate 
the pharmacist’s claim-right not to be harmed has always been subject to
the pharmacist’s conditional power to change Pauline’s relations to him
by creating in her a duty to compensate him for harm inflicted.23
 17. See id. at 58. 
18. Steinhoff, supra note 7, at 163 n.472. 
19. Id. at 164, n.473. 
20. See HOHFELD, supra note 1, at 50–51. 
21. Steinhoff, supra note 7, at 31, 54, 98, 169, 224. 
22. See generally HOHFELD, supra note 1.  Hohfeld’s conceptions are analytic in nature, 
not normative. 
23. See HOHFELD, supra note 1, at 38.
 453
























       
 
   
  
 




   
  
More importantly, Steinhoff makes the same mistake that Judith Jarvis 
Thomson and other commentators make.24  He mistakenly assumes that
Hohfeld conceptions are normative constraints on the normative relations 
that jurisdictions may wish to establish through law.25 Steinhoff assumes
that if a culpable aggressor forfeits—or, within Hohfeld’s framework, no 
longer possesses—a claim-right not to be harmed, then Hohfeld’s conceptual 
scheme precludes the state from requiring a defender to compensate the
aggressor for harm the defender inflicts, even if the state wishes to do so.26 
Thus, recall what Steinhoff says about a culpable aggressor who, by virtue
of his culpable aggression, loses his Hohfeldian claim-right not to be harmed:27 
Steinhoff says that, absent a concept of justifiable overriding of a subsisting
claim-right, Hohfeld’s framework would bar a jurisdiction from requiring
a defender to compensate the aggressor in the event that a jurisdiction
wished to do so.28  Hohfeld would bar compensation, Steinhoff states,
because by virtue of the culpable aggressor’s losing a Hohfeldian claim-
right that the defender not harm him, the defender possesses a liberty to 
harm him, and, by virtue of possessing a liberty-right to harm the aggressor, 
the defender cannot be required to compensate the aggressor.29 
Hohfeld’s conceptions do not preclude jurisdictions from establishing such
normative relations as they may choose, any more than Hohfeld’s conceptions
normatively justify such relations as jurisdictions may choose.30  Hohfeld’s
framework is a structure for conceptualizing such normative relations as 
jurisdictions may choose to establish.  Thus, Hohfeld does not bar a 
jurisdiction from empowering A to exercise a liberty-right to harm B while 
simultaneously conditioning A’s liberty-right on a power in B to exercise
a claim-right that A compensate him for the harm. On the contrary, A’s liberty 
to harm B is compatible with A’s having a duty to compensate B for 
harmed inflicted—just as B’s no-right that A refrain from harming him is 
compatible with B’s claim-right that A compensate him.
 24. See JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK 40–42, 54, 53, 66
(William Parent ed., 1986).
25. See Steinhoff, supra note 7, at 31.
 26. See id. at 33; THOMSON, supra note 24, at 41 (“The fact that compensation is
owing shows (and it seems to me, shows conclusively) that I did do something that you 
had a right that I not do.”).
27. See Steinhoff, supra note 7, at 30.
 28. Id. at 36
 29. Id.
30. For a commentator who assumes Hohfeld’s conceptions can justify normative 
relations rather than merely conceptualize them, see, for example, Yitzhak Benbaji, Culpable 
Bystanders, Innocent Threats and the Ethics of Self-Defense, 35 CAN. J. PHIL. 585, 606
(2005). 
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To illustrate, consider a classic subject of Hohfeldian analysis, that is,
the government power of eminent domain.31  Property owners typically have 
a claim-right vis-à-vis all persons—including the government—that title 
to their property not be transferred without their consent.32  However, an 
owner’s claim-right is always subject to a power in the government to 
change that relation by means of eminent domain.33  When the government 
exercises the power of eminent domain, the government does not infringe 
or override claim rights to property.34  Rather, claim-rights to property are
subject to a power in the government that the government is free to exercise 
when doing so serves a “public purpose[].”35  The government has a power 
to negate a property owner’s claim-right that title to his property not 
be transferred without his consent, subject to conditional power of the owner 
to exercise a claim-right that the government justly compensate him 
for appropriating title without his consent.36 
I have thus far addressed one instance of Steinhoff’s taking Hohfeld to 
be a normative constraint.  Now consider another: Steinhoff’s discussion 
of the relationship between Robert Nozick’s Falling Man and the Fallen-
Upon Man who is threatened by the former’s fall.37 
Steinhoff assumes that, prior to the fall, Falling Man and Fallen-Upon 
Man both possess claim-rights to life vis-à-vis one another.38  Steinhoff
also believes that, once Falling Man falls toward the Fallen-Upon Man, 
two relations exist: (1) Fallen-Upon Man has a liberty-right to “vaporize” 
Falling Man in order to protect himself, and (2) Falling Man, in turn, has 
a liberty-right to prevent Fallen-Upon Man from vaporizing him by vaporizing
him beforehand.39  I take no position on whether Steinhoff is right about
1 and 2, though I am inclined to believe he is.  I want to focus on how Steinhoff
conceptualizes what he believes to be Fallen-Upon Man’s justification for
vaporizing Falling Man whose threatening fall toward him is not the 
31. See, e.g., Joseph M. Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, 41 
YALE L.J. 221, 221 (1931). 
32. Id. at 221, 239 n.95. 
33. Id. at 228–31. 
34. See id. at 231 n.54. 
35. Id. at 232 (quoting Crenshaw & Crenshaw v. Slate River Co., 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 
245 (1828)).
36. Cormack, supra note 31; U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
37. Steinhoff, supra note 7, at 160. 
38. Id. at 163. 
39. Id. at 164. 
 455







   
  
   




     
 
 
   








   
 
product of agency on Falling Man’s part.40  Steinhoff says that because 
Falling Man lacks agency, it is “too strong” to say that Falling Man
threatens to violate Fallen-Upon Man’s claim-right to life.41  Yet, because
Steinhoff wishes to justify Fallen-Upon Man’s permission to vaporize 
Falling Man, Steinhoff concludes that Falling Man must have a “duty” not 
to crush Fallen-Upon Man:
Even though it seems too strong to say that the falling man is violating the right
of the other person (perhaps precisely because we associate violations with agency), 
he is nevertheless posing an unjust threat.  People . . . have a duty towards others
not to pose unjust threats to them . . . . [T]he falling man is not discharging his 
duties towards the man standing below . . . .42 
For Hohfeld, a statement like Steinhoff’s is a contradiction in terms. 
For Hohfeld, it is conceptually impossible for A to fail to fulfill a duty to 
B unless A also violates B’s claim-right because claim-rights and duties 
are “correlatives.”43  To say Falling Man has a duty not to crush Fallen-Upon
Man means that Fallen-Upon Man has a claim-right that Falling Man not
crush him.
The more interesting question is why Steinhoff balks at stating that Falling 
Man threatens to violate Fallen-Upon Man’s right to life.  Steinhoff does 
so, I believe, because he assumes Hohfeld’s conceptions—and, specifically, 
Hohfeld’s conception of claim-rights—constrain the normative relations 
that Steinhoff believes ought to obtain among persons: Steinhoff assumes 
Hohfeld’s claim-rights are not capacious enough to obtain vis-à-vis non-
agents.  But if Steinhoff is correct that Falling Man wrongs Fallen-Upon 
Man by crushing him, Steinhoff is mistaken in thinking that Hohfeld would
deny Fallen-Upon Man a claim-right against Falling Man.  Within Hohfeld’s 
framework, to say that a person, A, violates a duty toward B—or that A
wrongs B44—means that B has a claim-right that A has violated.
 40. Id.
 41. Id.
 42. Id. (footnote omitted).
43. See HOHFELD, supra note 1, at 30, 32–33. 
44. See HOHFELD, supra note 1, at 32.  For Hohfeld, to wrong a person is to do or
omit to do what one has a duty not to do or omit to do.  See id. at 26. 
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III.  HOHFELD’S CONCEPTIONS ADDRESS AFTER-THE-FACT LEGAL 

RELATIONS THAT OBTAIN BY VIRTUE OF ANTECEDENT 

MENTAL AND PHYSICAL EVENTS
 
Hohfeld emphasizes that his framework applies to legal relations that
otherwise arise from antecedent mental and physical events, not to the 
antecedent mental and physical events themselves:
At the very outset it seems necessary to emphasize the importance of differentiating 
purely legal relations from the physical and mental facts that call such relations
into being.
. . . .
Passing to the field of contracts, we soon discover a similar inveterate tendency
to confuse and blur legal discussions by failing to discriminate between the
mental and physical facts involved in the so-called “agreement” of the parties,
and the legal “contractual obligation” to which those facts give rise. . . . [One
must distinguish] between the agreement of the parties on the one hand, and, on
the other, the legal obligation (or aggregate of present and potential legal rights, 
privileges, powers and immunities, etc.) . . . .45 
Steinhoff overlooks this point in the course of discussing whether Hohfeld 
implicitly takes a position on whether justification is subjective rather than 
objective in nature. Steinhoff himself is a mixed subjectivist/objectivist: 
Steinhoff believes that an actor is not morally justified in harming another 
unless the actor is subjectively aware of justifying conditions that in fact 
obtain.46  However, Steinhoff fears Hohfeld might preclude a jurisdiction from 
embracing a subjective element because Steinhoff believes most Hohfeldian
rights and duties to be wholly objective in nature:
In this section I argue that the self-defense justification contains a subjective,
mental element. One cannot justifiably engage in self-defense without being in a 
certain mental state.  Given that some authors argue that all morality is purely 
objectivist and does not require of agents certain states of mind, I tried to show
that these objectivist authors are mistaken.  Yes, whether Hohfeldian rights are
violated or Hohfeldian duties are discharged is an objective matter (for most 
rights or duties) . . . .47 
Steinhoff’s fears are misplaced.  We have already seen that Hohfeld does
not constrain such jural relations as jurisdictions may wish to establish.
And this is why: Hohfeld, in his own words, is not concerned with the 
45. Id. at 27, 31. 
46. Steinhoff, supra note 7, at 159. 
47. Id. (second emphasis added). 
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“physical and mental” events that “give rise” to legal relations.48  He is 
only concerned with conceptualizing those relations once they obtain.49  Thus,
Hohfeld is not occupied with whether jurisdictions define justification solely
in terms of objective physical events or whether they also define justification 
subjectively; he cares only about conceptualizing existing relations of
justification given such antecedent events as jurisdictions take to be normatively
determinative.50 
IV. GENERIC ENTITLEMENTS, FOR EXAMPLE, RIGHTS, SHOULD BE 
REPLACED WITH MORE PERSPICUOUS CONCEPTIONS
Hohfeld famously urged that generic entitlements such as “rights” and 
“property,” be replaced with more perspicuous concepts, namely, claim-
rights, liberties, powers, and immunities, and their correlatives, that
is, duties, no rights, liabilities, and disabilities.51  And, of course, Steinhoff
knows that.  Nonetheless, Steinhoff overlooks the point by invoking the term
property right in a way that gets him into trouble.  Consider, for example,
the following statement by Steinhoff: 
A painting of Van Gogh does not lose its value only because its owner waives his 
property right over it, and the fact that it is unowned therefore does not provide
someone else with a justification for destroying it. If someone does try to destroy
it for the mere fun of it, the former owner seems to be justified in defending the 
painting within the limits of necessity and proportionality.52
The accuracy of Steinhoff’s statement depends upon what the owner’s 
property right consists of.  Typically, a property right is what Hohfeld calls
an “aggregate” of entitlements, consisting of multiple claim-rights, liberties, 
powers, and immunities vis-à-vis multiple parties, including the public at
large, subject to a variety of duties, no-rights, liabilities and disabilities.53 
An owner who possesses the requisite Hohfeldian powers may waive some
of those interests without waiving others.54  Let us assume that (1) the 
owner has claim-rights vis-à-vis members of the public at large that they
not (a) seize his painting, (b) exploit its economic value for their personal 
gain, and (c) destroy the painting; (2) the owner has a further liberty-right to
prevent others from destroying his painting; and (3) the state also possesses
 48. HOHFELD, supra note 1, at 27, 31. 
49. Id. at 32, 63. 
50. See id.
 51. See id. at 35–36.  For a commentator who, despite citing Hohfeld, uses “rights” 
to refer interchangeably to privileges and claim-rights, see Judith Jarvis Thomson, Self
Defense, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 300–03 (1991). 
52. Steinhoff, supra note 7, at 26 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
53. HOHFELD, supra note 1, at 28. 
54. See id. at 38–39, 53. 
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a claim-right against all persons, including the owner, that the painting not
be destroyed—that is, a claim-right in the state analogous to an author’s 
droit d’auteur. Let us further assume that the owner has powers to waive
all his claim-rights and liberty-rights  and that he selectively exercises his
powers to waive claim-rights 1(a), 1(b), and 1(c), but not liberty-right 2. 
In that event, Steinhoff’s statement is accurate: the owner’s waiver of his 
property rights in the form of his claim-rights does not negate either his 
liberty-right 2 or the state’s claim-right 3.  His waiver does not negate his
liberty-right to prevent others from destroying the painting and does not 
negate the state’s claim-right that no one, including the owner, destroy the
painting.
Now assume, in contrast, that (1) the state does not have a claim-right 
against all persons that the painting not be destroyed, and (2) the owner 
waives all his property rights, including both his claim-rights and his 
liberty-right to defend the painting.  In that event, Steinhoff’s statement 
regarding the owner’s property rights is false: by virtue of the waiver, the 
owner ceases to have a liberty-right to defend the painting against destruction 
and, ceasing to have it, has its Hohfeldian opposite, namely, a duty to 
refrain from preventing others from destroying the painting.55 
V. HOHFELD’S PROPOSED CONCEPTIONS ARE COMPREHENSIVE
Hohfeld asserts that his conceptual framework is comprehensive, that 
is, capable of encompassing any and all jural relations among persons, regardless
of their normative content.56  In contrast, Steinhoff claims that Hohfeld 
fails to account for certain relations that are essential to just norms of self­
defense.57 
Consider, for example, what Steinhoff says about a person who—in addition
to having a liberty-right to defend himself against persons who culpably
attack him—also has a claim-right to defend himself against them, that is, 
a claim-right that they not interfere with his self-defense.58  Steinhoff says, 
“Hohfeld himself does not really consider a claim-right of this form”
because it consists of a duty on the attacker’s part to refrain from conduct 
55. Compare Steinhoff, supra note 7, at 25, with HOHFELD, supra note 1, at 26. 
56. See HOHFELD, supra note 1, at 27, 63–64. 
57. See Steinhoff, supra note 7, at 31.
 58. Id. at 22, 24. 
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rather than a duty to engage in conduct.59  Steinhoff is mistaken. Hohfeld 
explicitly states that Hohfeldian duties—which are correlative of claim­
rights—can be either “affirmative” in nature or “negative.”60 
Furthermore, consider Steinhoff’s claims that (i) Hohfeld’s conceptions 
of claim-rights and liberties cannot accommodate the particularly strong 
interest a person has in defending himself against attack, and (ii) Hohfeld’s
conceptions must be supplanted by an additional conception, namely, that
of “Act-Specific Agent-Relative Prerogative”61: 
Conceiving of self-defense as both a claim-right and a liberty-right is necessary
to explain certain important features of self-defense.  However, neither a claim-
right nor a liberty right nor a combination of them can . . . account for the 
particular strength and weight of the self-defense justification.  To wit, the fact
that a defender may defend himself and others even if this prevents many others
from being saved calls for an explanation, and the only viable explanation seems 
to be one in terms of an act-specific, agent-relative prerogative.62 
Samuel Scheffler has postulated what could be called a general personal
prerogative. . . . However, there might be prerogatives tied to specific kinds of 
acts, so that a person engaging in those acts might be permitted to give even
greater weight to “projects” in the form of such acts than to most of her other
projects, and she might hence be permitted to impose even more costs on others 
than the general personal prerogative would allow.
. . . .
Thus, if there can be act-specific rights . . . there can also be act-specific prerogatives . . . .

It seems to me that self-defense is just such a kind of act.
 
. . . .
 
It is this distinction between acts that come with a prerogative and acts that
do not that explains the normative difference between acts of killing or harming
in self-defense and acts of non-defensively killing . . . . This difference cannot be 
satisfactorily explained by . . . . a liberty or a claim-right to self-defense.63 
With due respect, Steinhoff confuses the nature and strength of the
normative interests that jurisdictions consider prior to establishing jural
relations with Hohfeld’s framework for conceptualizing those relations
after jurisdictions establish them.  Jurisdictions may, of course, take act-specific 
and agent-relative considerations into account in establishing jural relations.
Any interests in self-defense that a jurisdiction chooses to establish as
 59. Id. at 22 n.50.  True, Hohfeld does not propose a single conception to encompass 
the combination of a person’s liberty-right to defend himself and a claim-right to prevent 
others from interfering with his self-defense.  See Luis Duarte d’Almeida, Fundamental 
Legal Concepts: The Hohfeldian Framework, 11 PHIL. COMPASS 554, 556 (2016). But 
Hohfeld does not need one; the combination of liberty-right and claim-right suffice entirely.
60. HOHFELD, supra note 1, at 73–74 (emphasis omitted). 
61. Steinhoff, supra note 7, at 29. 
62. Id. at 31–32. 
63. Id. at 31–32. 
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controlling, including agent-relative interests, can be captured by combining 
a liberty-right with a claim-right: A’s liberty-right vis-à-vis all persons— 
including the state—to defend himself means that no one can rightly
claim he is wrong to defend himself; and A’s a claim-right vis-à-vis all 
persons—including the state—to defend himself means that no one may
interfere with his liberty-right to defend himself.  Together, they are everything 
that A needs to defend himself.
VI. THE CORRELATIVE OF A LIBERTY IS A NO-RIGHT; THE

OPPOSITE OF A LIBERTY IS A DUTY
 
Claim-rights and liberties are the most popular of Hohfeld’s conceptions, 
at least among moral theorists.64  But, they are also the conceptions that 
are most often misunderstood.65 
Steinhoff’s discussion of claim-rights and liberties is generally accurate.
Yet he stumbles from time to time.  Consider, for example, Steinhoff’s 
discussion of why the concept of “forfeiture”—and, specifically, forfeiture 
by a culpable aggressor A of his claim-right to life—cannot fully account 
for what most people believe A’s potential victim B should be allowed to 
do to defend himself.66  Steinhoff says two things about A’s relation to B
that are correct: (1) by virtue of his culpable aggression, A no longer 
possesses a Hohfeldian claim-right to life vis-à-vis B, leaving B with a
liberty-right to harm A in self-defense; and (2) B’s Hohfeldian liberty-
right to defend himself, is nevertheless logically consistent with something
 64. See generally, e.g., Arthur L. Corbin, Rights and Duties, 33 YALE L.J. 501 (1924). 
65. For example, Herbert Hart assumes claim-rights must necessarily subsume 
liberties. See H. L. A. Hart, Bentham on Legal Rights, reprinted in  OXFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE 173–74 (A. W. B. Simpson ed., Oxford University Press 1973). Yet an 
actor A’s well-known right to do wrong consists precisely in his possessing claim-right to 
not being interfered with in doing X without possessing an accompanying privilege to do
X. See Mathew H. Kramer, Rights Without Trimmings, in A DEBATE OVER RIGHTS 13 
(1998).  Judith Thomson argues that Hohfeld’s equating of liberties with privileges is 
“surely wrong.”  JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 53 (1990). Yet it should 
be plain that (i) Hohfeld defines “liberty” as a synonym of “privilege,” and (ii) what
Thomson calls a “liberty” is merely a combination of a Hohfeldian privilege and a claim-
right. HOHFELD, supra note 1, at 42 (emphasis omitted).  Larry Alexander writes that if A
has a right vis-à-vis B not to be killed, A must also have a liberty to prevent B from killing
him. Larry Alexander, Self-Defense, Justification and Excuse, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 53, 
55 (1993).  Yet Alexander’s position is belied by the fact that citizens have a right not to
be wrongly arrested by the police and, yet, they lack a privilege to use force against the
police to prevent such wrongful arrests. 
66. Steinhoff, supra note 7, at 22. 
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that most people believe to be contrary to B’s just entitlements to defend 
himself, namely, a liberty-right in others, including A, to thwart B’s use 
of self-defensive force by interfering with it.67 
Unfortunately, in trying to clinch his rightful critique of forfeiture as 
being sufficient to encompass just entitlements to self defense, Steinhoff
invokes a flawed argument by Sanford Kadish.  Steinhoff writes: 
The defender’s Hohfeldian liberty to defensively kill an aggressor, after all, is by
definition perfectly compatible with the liberty of others to keep him from killing
the aggressor in self-defense.  Thus, as Sanford Kadish already pointed out a long
while ago, appeal to rights-forfeiture cannot explain why the state would wrong us (as
we certainly intuitively and quite rightly think it would) if it prohibited us from
defending ourselves.68 
Steinhoff repeats a mistake that Kadish and others make about the nature 
of liberties—and, in this case, about B’s liberty-right to defend himself.69 
A liberty is a permission to do something, for example, defend oneself, 
without violating a contrary legal obligation by doing so.70  The opposite
of a Hohfeldian liberty is a duty.71  Thus, the opposite of B’s liberty to
defend himself would be B’s duty not to defend himself.  B would have 
precisely such a negative duty—and, hence, B would lack a liberty of self­
defense—if, as Kadish says, the state prohibited him from defending
himself.72 In short, Kadish and Steinhoff cannot criticize a Hohfeldian
liberty as a ground for B’s self-defense by reflecting upon how one would feel
if the state prohibited B from defending himself because, if the state prohibited 
B from defending himself, B would lack rather than possess such a liberty. 
Why, then, do Kadish and Steinhoff think otherwise?  Why do they 
think B’s liberty to defend himself against A is compatible with the state’s 
prohibiting him from defending himself against A?  The answer, I believe, 
is that they overlook different normative roles that the state has toward B, 
depending upon whether B’s liberty-right is directed toward other individuals
or whether it is directed toward the state itself. When B’s liberty of self-
defense against A is directed toward other individuals—say, toward A himself
 67. Id.  Steinhoff is correct that A’s forfeiture of his claim-right that B not attack
him—and, hence, B’s possession of a liberty-right to attack A—is insufficient to account 
for what most people regard as B’s just entitlements to defend himself against A.  The 
latter entitlements entail that B have not only a liberty-right to attack A but also a claim-
right that A and others not resist him.  See supra Part V. 
68. Steinhoff, supra note 7, at 24 (footnotes omitted). 
69. See, e.g., Kimberly Ferzan, Self Defense and the State, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
449, 470–71 (2008). 
70. I assume that by “liberty-right,” Steinhoff and Kadish mean a multital liberty-
right rather than one directed solely against A alone. See infra Part VII. 
71. See HOHFELD, supra note 1, at 38–39. 
72. Steinhoff, supra note 7, at 24 (footnote omitted).
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and toward C and D—the state’s only role is to enforce what A, C, D, and
B may and may not do vis-à-vis one another as a result.  Thus, as Kadish 
and Steinhoff recognize, when B’s liberty of self-defense against A is 
directed toward individuals such as A, C, and D—and when B lacks a 
claim-right against A, C, and D that they not to interfere—B’s liberty-
right may coexist with A, C, and D possessing liberties to interfere with
and thwart B’s self-defense against A.73 If so, the state’s sole role is to 
ensure (i) B may defend against himself A without being deemed to have 
wronged A, C, and D, and (ii) A, C, and D, in turn, may interfere with B’s 
self-defense without being deemed to have wronged B. 
In contrast, when B’s liberty of self-defense against A is directed toward
the state, the state’s role is different: the state must not only enforce the
norm that B may defend himself against A without being deemed to
have wronged the state, it must also restrain itself and its officers
from interfering with B’s liberty.  It must do so because, if the state, which
is a norm-creator and norm-enforcer, directs its officers to interfere with
B’s self-defense, it is necessarily representing that B’s self-defense is 
something that he is not at liberty to do—something that it is wrong
for him to do.  To be sure, a police officer who is off-duty, out of uniform,
and not representing himself as a state official may be able to act in a 
private capacity and interfere with B.  However, a state official who acts 
on behalf of the state does not act as a private individual. The difference is 
significant because, in contrast to an individual who, in interfering with B, 
implicitly declares, “You cannot do this,” a state official who interferes with
B implicitly declares, “You may not do this.”  Yet for the state to declare that
B may not defend himself is to for the state to declare that B, does not
have a liberty-right to defend himself. 
Steinhoff makes a further error about liberties in this case regarding 
consent. Consent is a Hohfeldian power.74  A person, A, exercises a power 
of consent in criminal law by performing an act or possessing a state of 
mind that changes her jural relation to B, foregoing a claim-right against 
B and leaving B with a liberty-right vis-à-vis A.75  Thus, A’s consent to 
sex is a power by which A foregoes a claim-right that B not have sexual 
73. Id.
 74. DERYCK BEYLEVELD & ROGER BROWNSWORD, CONSENT IN THE LAW 64–74 (2007). 
75. Thomson appears to mistakenly assume that a person can exercise a power only 
by engaging in an act. See THOMSON, supra note 65, at 57.  In reality, Hohfeld places no 
constraint on whether a power—such as the power to consent—is exercised by an act or a 
mental state. See generally HOHFELD, supra note 1. 
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contact with her, replacing it with a liberty-right in B to have sexual contact
with A without wronging her.76 
Steinhoff argues that A’s consent to B’s doing something that B otherwise
has a duty to refrain from doing does not mean that B may do it:
Consider also that waiving a right to life is not the same as consenting to be
killed. . . . [S]uppose Norbert needed Catherine’s kidney to survive, and in order
to get it signed a contract in which he explicitly waives his moral right not to be
killed under the circumstances described above [that is, future circumstances in
which it may become necessary for Catherine to kill Norbert in order to save her
own life and in which killing Norbert would be proportionate]. Yet, when the 
time comes, he says: “Don’t kill me, don’t kill me”—that is, he does not consent 
(which does not undermine his previous signing of the contract and thus his rights
waiver). Is it really so clear that Catherine may kill him?77 
With due respect, Steinhoff confuses the validity of Norbert’s putative 
power to consent to be killed—and, hence, the validity of Catherine’s 
liberty-right to kill him—with the logical relationship between powers of
consent and liberty-rights.  Norbert’s written consent to Catherine’s
killing him may in reality be invalid because the jurisdiction at issue may
take the position that (1) individuals lack the power to consent to being 
killed, or (2) the power of individuals to consent to being killed does not 
include the power to give prospective consent that overrides their contemporaneous
objections to being killed.78 If, however, the state and others lack claim-
rights that individuals not acquiesce in their own homicides, and if consent
to be killed includes the right to give prospective consent in the face of 
contemporaneous objection, then, contrary to what Steinhoff implies, it is
clear that Catherine has a liberty-right to kill Norbert because valid 
consent by A to B’s doing X means that B may do X.
VII. HOHFELD’S ENTITLEMENTS ARE DIRECTED, SPECIFYING 

PRECISELY WHOM THEY ARE AMONG
 
Hohfeld emphasizes that the entitlements he conceptualizes consist of 
directed relations—that is, they consist of entitlements among specified 
persons.79  This is not to say that Hohfeld’s entitlements obtain only between
76. Needless to say, B’s liberty to have sex with A without wronging her is consistent 
with A’s possessing a liberty to thwart B’s efforts.
77. Steinhoff, supra note 7, at 28. 
78. Generally, jurisdictions do not accord persons powers to give prospective
consent to X sufficient to override their subsequent and contemporaneous objections to X. 
See PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT 248–67 (2004). 
79. See HOHFELD, supra note 1, at 60–61, 92–93.  The term “directed” comes from 
Michael Thompson, What is it to Wrong Someone? A Puzzle About Justice, Reason and Value, 
in REASON AND VALUE 333, 344 (R. Jay Wallace, Phillip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler & Michael
464
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binary individuals.  On the contrary, they can also be what Hohfeld calls 
“multital” in nature—that is, they can obtain between an individual, on the
one hand, and all persons on the other, or between all persons and all persons.80 
Regardless, however, an entitlement remains unconceptualized for Hohfeld 
unless it specifies the person or persons toward whom it is directed.81 
Steinhoff appears to overlook this feature of Hohfeld in denying that 
Hohfeldian liberties suffice to permit a defender to use force against an attacker.
Thus, Steinhoff makes the following statement:
[W]hile the rights-forfeiture and liberty-right approach to self-defense indeed
explains certain normative features of self-defense, it nevertheless cannot explain
the permissibility of self-defense: a person’s mere lack of a right not to be harmed
provides by itself no . . . permission to harm her.
. . . .
. . . [A] Hohfeldian liberty to kill is and remains a mere liberty to kill.  It cannot
be magically transformed into a justification to kill, and nothing is able to change
this, least of all a background presumption against killing: if we are to assume
that we are not permitted to kill, then we should certainly not suddenly feel 
permitted to kill only because we have a mere liberty to do so.82 
There are two ways to account for this statement, one of which, as 
discussed below, is that Steinhoff mistakenly conflates law with morals.83 
The other, however, is that Steinhoff fails to specify the persons to whom
the defender’s liberty applies and thereby conflates an undirected liberty
with a supposed problem regarding liberties themselves. 
Steinhoff starts by stating that the defender has a “liberty-right” to use 
force against his attacker.84  Yet Steinhoff fails to specify the person toward
Smith eds., 2004) and Simon Căbula May, Directed Duties, 10 PHIL. COMPASS 523, 523 
(2015).
80. See HOHFELD, supra note 1, at 73.
81. Simon May argues “non-directed” moral duties can exist—that is, duties that 
are possessed but not owed to any person or group of persons who are wronged by their 
violation, for example, a duty that a person possesses not to destroy a Chagall masterpiece
in his possession. See May, supra note 79.  I am skeptical that destroying a Chagall wrongs 
no one, past, present, or future. But, if destroying the painting wrongs no one, then either 
the person has no moral duty to refrain from destroying it or he has a moral duty to the 
thing of beauty itself.  If the possessor does, indeed, have a moral duty toward the painting, 
for Hohfeld, the painting also has a moral claim on its possessor, because, for Hohfeld, 
claims and duties are alternative ways of referring to the same thing.  See HOHFELD, supra
note 1, at 73. 
82. Steinhoff, supra note 7, at 22–23. 
83. See infra Part VIII. 
84. Steinhoff, supra note 7, at 21–22. 
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whom the liberty-right is directed.85  If the defender’s liberty-right is a
“multital” liberty toward the world at large, including the state, then the 
defender does have “permission” to harm his attacker because that is what
a “multital” liberty is in Hohfeld’s taxonomy: it is a “permission” of a 
person that is binding on everyone else.86 
Alternatively, the defender’s liberty-right may be directed solely toward 
his attacker and, hence, may consist solely of the fact that the attacker himself
has no personal right to complain if the defender resorts to self defense.87 
If so, the defender’s liberty-right to defend himself may simultaneously
coexist with a claim-right on the state’s part that the defender not harm 
his attacker.88 In that event, far from having a liberty-right vis-à-vis the 
state to harm his attacker, the defender has a Hohfeldian duty not to.89  That
does not mean liberties are incapable of bestowing permission.90 After 
all, a legal liberty is a legal permission, just as a moral liberty is a moral
permission.  Rather, it means, that one cannot fault Hohfeld’s liberties for
failing to function as permissions when one fails to specify the persons 
toward whom the liberties are directed.
 85. See generally id. at 21–32. 
86. HOHFELD, supra note 1, at 72 (“A multital right, or claim . . . is always one of a 
large class of fundamentally similar yet separate rights, actual and potential, residing in a 
single person . . . but availing respectively against persons constituting a very large and
indefinite class of people.”) (footnote omitted); id. at 50 (“A license is merely a permission
to do an act which, without such permission, would amount to a trespass . . . .”) (quoting 
Clifford v. O’Neill, 42 N.Y.S. 607, 609 (1896)). 
87. Id. at 73. 
88. See id.
 89. See id.
90. Jeremy Waldron argues that, although Hohfeld’s conceptions readily apply to 
legal relations, they do not so readily apply to moral relations.  See JEREMY WALDRON, 
LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981–1991 67–68 (1993). Specifically, he argues 
that, although claim-rights and duties are correlative in law, they are not correlative in
morals. See id.  In law, he says, to have a liberty to do X means that (1) one does not
violate another’s claim-rights by doing X, and (2) one has no duty to refrain from doing 
X—propositions one and two being alternative ways of saying the same thing. See id. In 
contrast, Waldron says, although having a moral liberty to do X does, indeed, mean number 
one, it does not necessarily mean number two.  See id.  One can have a moral liberty to do 
X, he says—that is, a moral ability to do X without violating anyone’s claim-rights—and, 
yet, have a moral duty not do X—where, for example, doing X does not violate anyone’s
rights, and, yet, because doing X is “vicious,” doing X is “wrong.” Id. Ultimately, this is
a disagreement over terminology in which only one party to the disagreement, Hohfeld, 
defines his terms.  Hohfeld defines an actor’s duty and another’s claim-right as alternative 
references to the same thing, thereby making it impossible for a person to violate a duty
without violating another’s claim-rights.  See HOHFELD, supra note 1, at 35–36.  Waldron 
implicitly understands duty and claim-rights differently, but he does not clarify the difference
or explain why it matters. See WALDRON, supra note 90. 
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VIII. HOHFELD ADDRESSES LEGAL RELATIONS NOT MORAL ONES
Hohfeld was a law professor who sought to conceptualize persons’ legal
relations to the state, regardless of whether such relations are morally just. 
However, that does not mean Hohfeld’s framework cannot be applied to 
moral relationships.91  It means, rather, that when theorists invoke Hohfeld 
without specifying whether they are addressing law or morals, they risk 
causing confusion.
To illustrate, recall Steinhoff’s previously-quoted statement to the effect a
liberty-right to harm does not mean permissibility to harm.92  Steinhoff does 
not specify whether his references to liberty and permissibility are legal, moral, 
or a mixture of the two.93 As a result, it is possible that, when Steinhoff 
states that a liberty-right does not mean permissibility, he may not be making
a profound observation.  He may instead be making what David Enoch
calls the “trivial” observation that legal liberty-rights are not necessarily
moral liberty-rights.94 
IX. CONCLUSION
Hohfeld has lost cachet over the past one hundred years.  And that may
not be a bad thing.  With the possible exception of the distinction between
claim-rights and liberties, Hohfeld’s conceptions have tended to founder 
in the marketplace of ideas, at least among lawyers. To be sure, we criminal 
law theorists continue to invoke Hohfeld, and, when we do, our invocations
function a bit like Latin maxims.  Like Latin maxims, references to Hohfeld 
can illuminate.  But like Latin maxims, references to Hohfeld can also
obfuscate.  It is incumbent upon all of us, including myself, to invoke Hohfeld 
with care and to scrutinize with skepticism how we and others invoke him.
91. For a commentator who mistakenly argues that Hohfeld cannot be adapted to
morals, see Philip Montague, War and Self-Defence: A Critique and a Proposal, 23 DIAMETROS
69, 69–70 (2010).  But see  THOMSON, supra note 65, at 33. For a commentator who
mistakenly conflates a legal liberty-right to do X with psychological or sociological liberty
to do X, see generally J.M. Balkin, The Hohfeldian Approach to Law and Semiotics, 44 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1119 (1990). 
92. See supra Part VII. 
93. See Steinhoff, supra note 7, at 22.
 94. David Enoch, A Right to Violate One’s Duty, 21 LAW & PHIL. 355, 360 (2002). 
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